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COMMENTS
WRONGFUL LIFE: SHOULD THE ACTION BE ALLOWED?
A woman undergoes a bilateral tubal ligation to prevent conception
because she fears a hereditary impairment. The doctor improperly performs
the operation and the woman becomes pregnant; subsequently a child is
born with birth defects that will require extensive medical treatment. The
parents of the child bring suit against the doctor to recover their expenses
incurred because of the pregnancy, and to recover the costs associated
with rearing the deformed child along with their general pain and suffering
damages. In addition, the parents sue on behalf of the child alleging that
he should never have been born; in other words, the child alleges that he
has been injured by the fact of his birth and seeks compensation for
having been born.
This paper examines the suit brought on behalf of the child, namely
a wrongful life action. While not ignoring the problems of fitting wrongful
life into the traditional tort framework of duty, causation, and damages,
this analysis focuses primarily on the policy-oriented problems inherent in
the action.' Two principal policy dilemmas will be addressed: identification
Copyright 1987, by LOUISIANA LAw REvIEw.
1. To find tort liability on the part of a defendant, it must be established that the
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty. It has been suggested in the wrongful life cases that
the duty to the unborn child flows from the duty owed to the mother, a duty to properly
inform. See Comment, "Wrongful Life": The Right Not to Be Born, 54 Tul. L. Rev.
480 (1980). In wrongful birth cases, the parents claim they would have avoided conception
or terminated the pregnancy had they been properly informed of the risks involved;
therefore, the duty was breached by the giving of misinformation. However, in wrongful
life cases, the duty is to a nonexistent person. The plaintiff.in the wrongful life action
does not exist at the time of the breach.
There are cases that have established a duty owed to a nonexistent person. In Renslow
v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 II. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1967), a doctor negligently transfused
Rh positive blood into a woman who had Rh negative blood. Years later, a child was
born with severe defects attributable to the transfusion of incompatible blood. The court
stated that the doctor owed a duty to the child because it was foreseeable that a child
would later be born with problems because of the transfusion. But see Albala v. City of
New York, 54 N.Y.2d 269, 429 N.E.2d 786, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1981), which held a child
does not have an action for a pre-conception tort committed against his mother. In that
case, the mother's uterus was perforated when she underwent an abortion; four years
later, the child was born brain damaged. Although the court stated it was foreseeable
that the mother would again conceive and the child could be affected adversely, the court
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of the injury and assessment of the type and amount of damages to be
awarded. The state of the law in Louisiana is noted, and it is suggested
that Louisiana follow the majority rule and refuse to recognize a cause
of action in wrongful life.
In the 1963 case of Zepeda v. Zepeda,2 an extramarital child sued his
father because he would be required to live with the stigma of illegitimacy.
Although the court denied recovery, Zepeda was the origin of the tort
action which came to be known as wrongful life in Gleitman v. Cosgrove.3
In Gleitman, brought four years after Zepeda, a child was born with birth
defects attributable to German measles, a disease which the mother had
been informed would have no effect on the child she was carrying. The
court dismissed the wrongful life complaint. By 1980, only five state
supreme courts4 had considered the wrongful life cause of action; all
denied that foreseeability is the only question in this type of case.
Even Renslow supports the idea of duty in only some cases. In genetic counseling suits,
it reasonably can be said that the negligent party should foresee that if the testing is
improperly performed and the parents rely on that information, the child born could
have the defects from the hereditary impairment that should have been detected. The
forseeability is not as clear in failed sterilization cases. In those situations, the doctor
can reasonably foresee that if the procedure is negligently performed, the woman could
become pregnant. Absent any indication or suspicion of hereditary impairments or problems
manifested in the woman's other children, however, the doctor can not be expected to
forsee the birth of a deformed child.
Other duty problems exist. If in a wrongful life case the doctor does owe a duty to
the not yet existing person based on the parents' need for accurate information, when
does this duty end? Suppose a man and woman undergo genetic counseling and incorrectly
are told that they are not carriers of a certain impairment. The woman becomes pregnant.
Later it is learned that the tests were improperly performed, and the parents discover the
error. Does the counselor's duty now end because the parents have received the proper
information and an abortion is available?
Even if duty can be established in wrongful life cases, causation is still a problem. The
negligent party is being sued for causing the birth through either a failure to prevent
conception or a failure to properly inform the parents so that conception could be avoided
or the pregnancy could be terminated. The defendant is not being sued over the birth
defect. He did not cause the impairments from which the child suffers; nature did. It
should be noted, however, that in some of the wrongful life cases the defendant is the
cause of the deformity. For example, in Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d
460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983), the doctor prescribed Dilantin to the mother to control her
epilepsy; the medicine caused birth defects in two children. Plaintiffs could have brought
this case under a typical malpractice theory, alleging that the doctor caused the defects
and seeking recovery therefore, and the problems discussed in this article could have been
avoided.
Although this cursory discussion poses many interesting questions, a thorough exami-
nation of the issues raised is beyond the scope of this article.
2. 41 I11. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (I11. App. 2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 945, 85 S. Ct. 444 (1964).
3. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
4. Numerous appellate court decisions were rendered during this time period; this
comment analyzes only state supreme court decisions. No United States Supreme Court
decision has addressed this issue.
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disallowed it.' Since then, that figure has almost tripled with only three
state supreme courts allowing the action, all of which limited recovery.6
5. The five state supreme courts which faced wrongful life claims were: the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967), overruled
in part by Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979), overruled by Procanik by
Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984), in which the New Jersey court
recognized the wrongful life action, see infra note 5 (child born with Down's Syndrome
after doctors did not tell the mother of the availability of amniocentesis); the New York
Court of Appeals in Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 30 N.Y.2d 895, 283 N.E.2d
616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972) (mother gave birth to deformed child after she was told
by doctors, who suspected the child was deformed, that abortion was not necessary), and
later in Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978)
(two cases: child born with Down's Syndrome to 37 year old mother who was never
advised of the increased pregnancy risks because of her age nor of the amniocentesis
procedure, and a child born with kidney disease after parents were advised that the same
disease, which caused the death of their first child, was not hereditary); the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974) (no wrongful
birth or wrongful life allowed for illegitimate child after mother consented to sexual
relations on the promise of marriage from an already married man), and again in Dumer
v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (child born with Rubella
Syndrome after doctor misdiagnosed German measles in first month of mother's preg-
nancy); the Delaware Supreme Court in Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975)
(healthy child born after doctor performed a bilateral tubal ligation); and the Alabama
Supreme Court in Elliot v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978) (child born with serious
deformities after vasectomy procedure on father).
6. The following state supreme courts have refused to recognize the action: the
Idaho Supreme Court in Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315 (1984) (child born
with severe congenital defects after doctor misdiagnosed rubella); the Texas Supreme Court
in Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W. 2d 918 (Tex. 1984) (child born with Duchenne muscular
dystrophy after mother was told she was not a genetic carrier of the disease); the North
Carolina Supreme Court in Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528 (1985),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 131 (1986) (child born with Down's Syndrome after doctor failed
to advise of availability of amniocentesis); the Kansas Supreme Court in Bruggeman by
Bruggeman v. Schimke, 239 Kan. 245, 718 P.2d 635 (1986) (child born with same congenital
anomalies as sister after parents were told that impairments were not genetically trans-
mitted); the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 513 A.2d
341 (N.H. 1986) (child born deformed after doctor failed to test and advise mother of
rubella and its possible effects); and the Minnesota Supreme Court in Hickman v. Group
Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986) (upheld as constitutional the state's
statutory ban on wrongful birth and wrongful life actions).
The following courts have also denied the action, but in a less clear manner: the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981)
(lower court judgment affirmed by an equally divided court where the child was born
with a crippling nerve disease after both vasectomy and abortion failed); the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982)
(court denied claims of "DES" daughters, classifying it as a wrongful life action); the
Wyoming Supreme Court in Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982) (doctor
performed 18 tubal ligations which resulted in 11 healthy children, four abortions and
three women still pregnant at the time of suit; court held that under the circumstances,
wrongful life actions would not be maintained); and the West Virginia Supreme Court
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In Louisiana, the supreme court has not addressed the issue, and only
one appellate court decision has been rendered on the subject of wrongful
life. 7
At the outset, it is necessary to distinguish wrongful life from two
closely related causes of action, wrongful pregnancy and wrongful birth.
Wrongful pregnancy, sometimes termed wrongful conception, is an action
brought by the parents of a generally healthy, but unwanted child whose
birth resulted from failed sterilization procedures, improperly administered
contraceptive measures, or late pregnancy diagnosis which prevented abor-
tion.8 Wrongful birth actions typically involve deformed children.9 Also
brought by the parents, the wrongful birth claims usually arise from
inadequate genetic counseling or failed sterilization procedures where par-
ents claim they would have avoided conception or terminated the pregnancy
had they been properly advised of the risks to the potential child. 0
An action for wrongful life, though based generally on the same fact
patterns as wrongful birth, differs in that the suit is brought on behalf
of Appeals in James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985) (court stated wrongful
life would not be recognized unless it was statutorily allowed; two cases: one healthy
child born after a failed tubal ligation, and one deformed child born after doctor failed
to perform amniocentesis).
The following three supreme courts have allowed wrongful life actions: the California
Supreme Court in Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337
(1982) (child born deaf after parents were told their first child did not suffer from the
same hereditary deafness); the Washington Supreme Court in Harbeson v. Parke-Davis,
Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983) (two children born deformed after doctor
prescribed Dilantin to mother to control her epilepsy); and the New Jersey Supreme Court
in Procanik by Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984) (child born with
Rubella Syndrome after doctor failed to diagnose German measles of mother). It appears
that the Illinois Supreme Court favors the wrongful life action. See Goldberg v. Ruskin,
113 I11. 2d 482, 499 N.E. 2d 406 (1986) (the court stated that no general damages are
available in wrongful life actions, but did not address the issue of special damages;
however, the court cited Simieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 134 I11. App. 3d 823, 480
N.E. 2d 1227 (1985), appeal allowed 109 Ill. 2d 589 (1985) which allowed the wrongful
life action but limited recovery to special damages).
7. Doe v. Cronan, 487 So. 2d 461 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986) (the court summarily
dismissed action brought by-child for illegitimate birth stating the authority for such
actions must come from the legislature or the Louisiana Supreme Court).
8. See, e.g., Yasar v. Cohen, 483 So..2d 1099 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
9. Some wrongful birth cases are brought by parents of healthy children, but often
the normal child rearing expenses are denied. For a discussion of whether to allow damages
for healthy children, see Miller v. Johnson, 231 Va. 177, 343 S.E.2d 301 (1986) (although
characterized in that opinion as wrongful pregnancy damages).
10. The state of wrongful birth claims and the damages recoverable in that action
varies widely from state to state. Some cases have disallowed the action completely; see,
e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967). Of those courts allowing
the wrongful birth action, the types of damages awarded has also varied. Compare, e.g.,
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) and Berman
v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979). See generally, University of Arizona Health
Services Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294 (1983).
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of the child. Confusion often arises as to the nature of a wrongful life
claim. The child is not suing for his birth defects, but for his existence.
The deformed child pleads not that the negligence of the defendant, usually
a doctor, caused his birth defects, but rather that the defendant's negligence
caused his birth. The child's claim is that he never should have been born,
in other words, that he would be better off dead."
Identifying the Injury
The courts have developed a recurring theme in their denial of
wrongful life-actions: that no injury has been suffered on the part of
the claimant by his birth. This idea has been addressed in a number
of ways, but is often couched in the rather nebulous concept of "pre-
ciousness of life."' 2 As was stated in the case of Coleman v. Garrison,
'3 the first decision to consider the Wrongful life action:
The preciousness of human life should not be held to vary with
the circumstances surrounding birth. To make such a determi-
nation, would, indeed, raise the unfortunate prospect of ruling,
as a matter of law, that under certain circumstances a child
would not be worth the trouble and expense necessary to bring
him into the world.' 4
The courts are unwilling to determine that life is an injury even when
plagued by severe deformities because such a finding would carry an
implicit denial of life as "precious."' 5
The basic problem with terming the life as a wrongful injury suffered
at the hands of the defendant is that the negligent party did not cause
the birth defects with which these children must live. The child never
had a chance at a normal life; the choice was unfortunately between
impaired life or no life, not between impaired life and nonimpaired
life.' 6 Theoretically, the court cannot look to the. defect to determine
the "injury," but must look to the fact of the life itself. Considering
life as the injury leads the courts to the unwanted task of determining
11. See, e.g., Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986).
12. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. 1974), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8
(1975), Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315, 322 (1984), and Bruggeman by
Bruggeman v. Schimke, 239 Kan. 245, 718 P.2d 635 (1986).
13. 327 A.2d 757 (Del. 1974).
14. Id. at 761.
15. But see Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 233, 643 P.2d 954, 962, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 337, 344-45 (1982), where the court stated, "[I]t is hard to see how an award of
damages to a severely handicapped or suffering child would 'disavow' the value of life."
16. Procanjk by Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 353, 478 A.2d 755, 763 (1984).
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whether it would have been better never to have been born, "a mystery
more properly left to the philosophers and theologians.' 17
A more pragmatic approach to the issue of injury, which includes
the preciousness of life reasoning, has been to suggest that there is no
right not to be born. In Bruggeman by Bruggeman v. Schimke, 18 a
wrongful life action was brought on behalf of a second-born child
suffering from genetic deformities alleging that his parents were im-
properly advised that their first child's defects were not the result of
chromosomal or biochemical imbalances. The Kansas Supreme Court
stated: "It has long been a fundamental principle of our law that human
life is precious .... A legal right not to be born-to be dead, rather
than to be alive with deformities-is a theory completely contradictory
to our law."' 9 The laws of this country protect life; there is no protection
of "non-life." Therefore, as explained in the failed vasectomy case of
Elliot v. Brown, 20 the wrongful life claimant is not standing on a
constitutionally guaranteed right, and absent any interest in protecting
nonexistence, the child lacks a legally recognizable injury.
A -variation of the idea that there is no right not to be born is the
idea that there is no right to be born "as a whole, functional human
being." '21 As pointed out in Procanik by Procanik v. Cillo, 22 a case
which allowed the wrongful life action, "the infant plaintiff never had
a chance of being born as a normal, healthy child. Tragically, his only
choice was a life burdened with handicaps or no life at all." '23 Under
such reasoning, the child has not been denied a right by being born
with birth defects any more than he has been denied a right by being
born.
An interesting argument used to counter the idea that there is no
right to be born without handicaps has been to analogize the wrongful
life action to the concept of a right to die. Finding a right to die allows
terminally ill patients to choose whether to undergo procedures or treat-
ment that might prolong life. The California Supreme Court in Turpin
v. Sortini 4 used the right to die concept to rebut the idea that all life
17. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y. 2d 401, 411, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d
895, 900 (1978).
18. 239 Kan. 245, 718 P.2d 635 (1986).
19. 718 P.2d at 642.
20. 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978) (in this case, the vasectomy was not a cause of the
birth defect; the procedure was sought because of a fear of the effects of pregnancy upon
the mother).
21. Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 88, 400 N.Y.S. 2d 110, 114 (1977), modified by
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y. 2d 401, 386 N.E. 2d 807, 413 N.Y.S. 2d 895 (1978).
22. 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984).
23. Id. at 353, 478 A.2d at 763.
24. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
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is preferable to nonlife; the implicit suggestion is that life itself can be
an injury. 25
A comparison between wrongful life and right to die reasoning was
recently made in Smith v. Cote.26 However, in Smith v. Cote, a case
in which the doctor negligently failed to diagnose the mother's German
measles, the court distinguished the reasoning in wrongful life claims
from right to die cases. In a right to die case, consideration is given
to the person's autonomy 27 in deciding whether to prolong life through
what often can be very painful, costly measures; 28 the issue is the person's
right to choose life or death rather than a determination of that life
as wrongful. In wrongful life cases, the determination is whether the
child's life is one not worth living, whether the child would be better
off never having existed. "Simply put, the judiciary has an important
role to play in protecting the privacy rights of the dying. It has no
business declaring that among the living are people who never should
have been born." 29
Criteria for defining injury
In addition to the courts' unwillingness to declare as a matter of
law that a life is not worth living is the problem of determining the
criteria that would warrant the conclusion that a child's defect is so
serious that he would be better off dead. This problem is perhaps most
evident in Turpin, a decision that recognized an action for wrongful
life.3° In that case, the wrongful life claimant had been born deaf; no
other physical infirmities existed. The court determined that "[iun this
case, in which plaintiff's only affliction is deafness, it seems quite
unlikely that a jury would ever conclude that life with such a condition
is worse than not being born at all."'" Although the case was reversed
and remanded for trial, no indication was given by the court as to what
would constitute a finding of "wrongful" life.
25. Id. at 233, 643 P.2d at 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
26. 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986).
27. See, e.g., La. R.S. 40:1299.58.1.A(l) (Supp. 1987) which states: "All persons
have the fundamental right to control the decisions relating to their own medical care,
including the decisions to have life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances
where such persons are diagnosed as having a terminal or irreversible condition."
28. See, e.g., La. R.S. 40:1299.58.1.A(7) (Supp. 1987) which states: "The artificial
prolongation of life ... may ... secure only a precarious and burdensome existence
while providing nothing medically necessary or beneficial to the person." See also, La.
R.S. 40:1299.58.2(4) and (8) (Supp. 1987).
29. 513 A.2d at 353.
30. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1987).
31. Id. at 234, 643 P.2d at 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
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As the court in the case of Elliot v. Brown 2 queried, "What criteria
would be used to determine the degree of deformity necessary to state
a claim for relief?" 3 Must multiple defects exist, or just serious physical
defects, or are severe mental deficiencies enough? The courts would not
be asking a jury to determine negligence or damages or criminal culp-
ability, but rather the determination of whether someone ever should
have existed.
Practical considerations arise here. The child for whom the action
has been brought cannot be asked whether he would rather be dead;
he is too young or too uncomprehending to understand the question.
The parents have decided for the child that the quality of his life warrants
a wrongful life action. Whether or not the child prevails in his action,
the court record always exists to remind the child that at least his
parents, if not a jury, determined that he would have been better off
had he never been born.
There is also the broader consideration of people who now live with
the same or similar afflictions as the children involved in a wrongful
life action. Disabled people must not only live with their handicaps, but
must also face the "discrimination stemming not only from simple
prejudice, but from 'archaic attitudes and laws' and from 'the fact that
the American people are simply unfamiliar with and insensitive to the
difficulties confronting individuals with handicaps.' ' ' 4 The growing
awareness of disabled people as productive members of society and the
legislation passed to aid handicapped persons" should not be undermined
by a judicial determination that entire groups of people have "wrongful"
lives.
32. 381 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978).
33. Id. at 548.
34. School Bd. of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987). The
Supreme Court held that a teacher who had tuberculosis was protected under a statute
aiding the handicapped.
35. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. 1132-1 (1980) (making higher education facilities accessible
to handicapped persons); 20 U.S.C. 1403 (1983) (setting up of the National Advisory
Committee on Handicapped Children to be filled by the handicapped and parents of such
children to review education for handicapped children); 23 U.S.C. 402(b)(1)(E) (1984)
(providing for reasonable and safe access for movement across curbs by handicapped
persons); 29 U.S.C. 792 (1984) (providing for the Architectural and Transportation Barriers
Compliance Board which includes five handicapped persons to examine, among other
things, alternative approaches for building and transportation barriers to the handicapped).
See, e.g., in Louisiana, La. R.S. 40:1299.113 (1981) which establishes "a comprehensive
program designed to provide for the coordinated treatment, habilitation, and rehabilitation
of persons suffering from congenital or acquired spinal cord dysfunctions."
1326 [Vol. 47
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Monetary awards
In a wrongful life action, the plaintiff child theoretically could collect
damages for special expenses, such as medical treatment and special
training or schooling, and for general pain and suffering.3 6 It should
be noted that some states allow the parents in a wrongful birth action
to recover special expenses incurred on behalf of the child;17 in such
states, only the general pain and suffering damages will be at issue in
a wrongful life action since the parents will have already recovered
special expenses.38 When the parent's wrongful birth claim has prescribed,
however, the special damages are at issue. 9
Special damages
The courts that have allowed the wrongful life action have limited
recovery to special damages. Justification for the award of special dam-
ages rests in the rationale that, but for the defendant's negligence, the
child would never have incurred these expenses since the child would
never have been bornA0 Although this is true, the child is not suing the
defendant under the theory of wrongful life because of the defects, but
rather because he is alive and suffering. The negligent party did not
cause the birth defects; the wrongful life claim does not allege that the
defendant did. The only allegation is that the defendant's acts wrongfully
allowed the child to be born. The birth defects in these cases do not
arise from actions of the defendant, but from nature. 4' Although the
courts admit the lack of a human hand in the defect, these courts are
still willing to impose special damages under the theory of wrongful
life.42
Ironically, the Turpin case points out that tort damages are com-
pensatory in nature, that they are designed "not to punish a negligent
defendant but to restore an injured person as nearly as possible to the
position he or she would have been in had the wrong not been done. '43
In these cases, had the wrong not been done, the child never would
36. See, e.g., 31 Cal. 3d at 224, 233-34, 643 P.2d at 956, 962, 182 Cal. Rptr. at
339, 345.
37. See supra note 10.
38. See, e.g., Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 354 (N.H. 1986).
39. See, e.g., Procanik by Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984).
40. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d at 231, 643 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr.
at 344, and Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 482-83, 656 P.2d 483, 497
(1983).
41. See generally supra note 1.
42. See generally Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr.
337 (1982).
43. Id. at 232, 643 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
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have been born. Thus, under the minority view, there is no reason not
to grant the child normal expenses of day-to-day life. But for the
defendant's negligence, the child would never have had to go to school
or purchase any of the necessities of life. However, the courts are not
willing to do this; in fact, even in wrongful birth cases, claimants are
often denied these normal daily expenses. 44
In allowing only extraordinary medical expenses, the court in
Procanik45 stated that its decision was not based on the premise that
nonlife was better than impaired life but was "predicated on the needs
of the living. We seek only to respond to the call of the living for help
in bearing the burden of their affliction. ' 46 Although this is a very
noble goal, the court should not choose which damages they want to
allow and then deny those which logically flow from their reasoning.
To do so is to choose a result and then to ignore the reasoning used
in reaching that result.
Incalculability of general damages
An often cited reason for denying wrongful life, even assuming a
recognized injury exists, is that general damages "are certainly beyond
computation. ' 47 The courts are unwilling to place a monetary value on
life itself. In traditional personal injury cases, a jury is asked to determine
the difference between life with the impairment and life without the
impairment. In a wrongful life case, the determination is not of an
impairment, but the calculation of life versus nonlife. The negligent
party is not being asked to answer for the impairment, but to compensate
for the life itself. The defendant is not paying for the pain of a physical
injury or even for the wrongful death of a person, but for the pain
and suffering of being alive.
It is interesting to note that of the three decisions which have allowed
the wrongful life action, all have denied the award of general damages
for the same reasons given by those courts denying the action. There
is no rational way to measure life against nonlife; and even if a measure
could be divined, the damages are too speculative. 48
44. See generally supra note 10.
45. 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984).
46. Id. at 353, 478 A.2d at 763.
47. See, e.g., Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 482, 656 P.2d 483,
496 (1983).
48. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 235, 643 P.2d 954, 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337,
346 (1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 482, 656 P.2d 483, 496-97
(1983); Procanik by Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 353-54, 478 A.2d 755, 763 (1984).
1328 [Vol. 47
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Other Damage Considerations
The heavy financial burden imposed on the defendant in these cases
is obvious. Admittedly, the defendant has been negligent and his neg-
ligence has placed serious economic hardships on the family affected.
However, by allowing all of the possible damages to be recovered,
especially general damages of the parents and child and normal day-to-
day expenses, the recovery will be excessive in comparison to the act.
The harshness of the remedy does more than encourage diligence among
those in the profession; it discourages the actual practice of that profes-
sion because of high litigation and insurance costs, 49 and increases the
costs of the industry itself.5 0
Another issue, rarely addressed, is mitigation of damages. In several
cases, the woman had the opportunity of undergoing an abortion and
chose not to or placing the child for adoption.' Should the negligent
party then be held accountable in actions for wrongful pregnancy, wrong-
ful birth, or wrongful life when the birth could have been prevented
or the child placed with people who would not have found the life
wrongful? Clearly, this is a very sensitive issue. The courts probably
would not want to hold that a mother has the duty to abort, especially
given the fact that for many people abortion is not a viable alternative
due to religious or moral beliefs. Forcing someone to place their child
for adoption is equally difficult.12
This raises another question. Could a child after reaching majority
bring a wrongful life action against his parents because he was brought
into the world instead of being aborted? Although this may sound
farfetched, the California legislature, in response to an appellate court
decision in that state that allowed the wrongful life action, passed a
statute relieving parents of any liability in these cases. 3
Louisiana
As of this writing, the Louisiana Supreme Court has not addressed
the wrongful life action. The sole appellate decision, Doe v. Cronan,5 4
49. P. Danzon, Medical Malpractice 85 (1985). But see also for an earlier study, G.
Burghart, Medical Malpractice and the Supply of Surgeons in The Economics of Medical
Malpractice 103-23 (1978).
50. P. Danzon, Medical Malpractice 2-4 and 131-32 (1985).
51. See, e.g., Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
52. See, e.g., University of Arizona v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 586 n.5, 667
P.2d 1294, 1301 n.5 (1983) (discussed in the wrongful birth context).
53. Cal. Civ. Code § 43.6 (West 1982) which states in part: "No cause of action
arises against a parent of a child based upon the claim that the child should not have
been conceived or, if conceived, should not have been allowed to have been born."
54. 487 So. 2d 461 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
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involved a factual situation similar to Zepeda, the illegitimate status
case. The court summarily dismissed the case, finding no cognizable
cause of action for being born illegitimate.5 It is submitted that when
the courts are confronted with a more typical wrongful life action, they
should follow the majority rule and deny the cause of action.
In addition to the concerns discussed above, further policies of this
state warrant nonrecognition of wrongful life. Louisiana always has had
a strong policy of protecting the family, as is obvious through an
examination of its successions law56 and family law.5 7 Implicit in these
provisions is the recognition of the importance of the family unit. To
allow parents to declare that their child's life is not one worth living
could easily strain the parent-child relationship and leave the child to
later ponder his own self-worth. Also relevant is Civil Code article 227,
which states: "Fathers and mothers, by the very act of marrying, contract
together the obligation of supporting, maintaining, and educating their
children." At the least, the collection of damages for the normal day
to day expenses of rearing a child under wrongful birth and wrongful
life actions would be in contavention of this article. The obligation to
support children is on their parents, not upon a negligent party who
caused their birth.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is submitted that policy reasons dictate that wrong-
ful life should not be allowed. The claim questions the belief of the
preciousness of life itself; it finds life to be an injury. Wrongful life
claims pose serious problems as to what criteria define a "worthless"
life. It allows parents to declare that their child's life is not worth
living, straining the family unit and leaving the child to speculate later
on the value of his existence. Additionally, a judicial determination of
a life as "wrongful" because of an accompanying handicap makes serious
inroads into the progress made toward changing society's attitudes toward
the disabled. Wrongful life cases necessarily entail speculative damages
impose disproportionately high costs upon defendants. It poses difficult
55. Id. at 462.
56. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 1495 dealing with forced heirs which states: "[Tihe
heirs are called forced heirs, because the donor cannot deprive them of the portion of
his estate reserved for them by law, except in cases where he has just cause to disinherit
them." See also, La. Const. art. XII, § 5 which states in part, "No law shall abolish
forced heirship."
57. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 146 which declares that joint custody of children
is favored. See also, Brooks v. Brooks, 469 So. 2d 398, 400 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985)
which states: "The primary purpose of La. C. C. art. 146 is to promote the children's
best interest by allowing the physical care and custody of the children to be shared by
the parents so that the children have frequent, continuing contact with both parents."
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abortion and adoption questions. The traditional tort framework issues
should not be addressed; the claim should be denied for policy reasons
before those issues are even considered.
Kathleen Gallagher

